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CHAPTER 2
Infrastructure Regulation: What Works,
Why, and How do we Know?
Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Marcos 
Fernández-Gutiérrez and Julio Revuelta
Public infrastructure services have been subject to dramatic regulatory
reform since the 1980s in the European Union, particularly privatization,
at the national level, and increased liberalization and deregulation, via
the Single Market Programme. Despite this ambitious reform pro-
gramme, there are signs that regulation does not always work. The
Commission has recognised the limitations of reform undertaken so far.
Recently, it generated a list of 23 sectors which were crucial for economic
growth and “malfunctioning” in the Single Market. This list included
major public infrastructure services — energy, gas, telecommunications
and transportation. Attempts are being made to identify the causes of
this “malfunctioning” and it is expected that new regulation will be
implemented to improve this situation. As part of efforts to make these
markets perform better, policy-makers are turning their attention to bet-
ter understand the consumer. Previously, regulation was based on the
economic theory which assumed that consumers were rational and selfish.
However, this is now being questioned using insights from Behavioural
Economics. The Directorate General for Health and Consumers is mov-
ing towards a more eclectic approach to economics. In this light, this
paper analyses regulatory reform of public infrastructure services from a
user-consumer perspective. Stated (derived from the Eurobarometer) and
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revealed (derived from Household Budget Survey) preferences of con-
sumers with respect to public services are analyzed to enable a better
understanding of consumer behaviour. By contrasting stated and
revealed preferences, new insights into consumer behaviour can be
gained. These insights may be useful in future regulation of infrastruc-
ture services in many countries worldwide. The new evidence generated
can be used as a basis for the development of new consumer or user-
related regulation.
1. Introduction
Most infrastructure regulations deal with the supply-side because it is
usually assumed that regulation works for consumers when competi-
tion among firms in an integrated market is being promoted.
Independent Regulatory Agencies, therefore, tend to focus on providing
well-functioning markets via policies to avoid market concentration,
guarantee market entry and supervise licensing, use and access to net-
works, interconnection, prices and so on. What finally matters in the
regulation of public infrastructure services, however, is the user. Despite
this, knowledge about patterns of user behaviour vis-à-vis these services
is often deemed of secondary importance, at best, or, at worst, ignored
while designing regulatory regimes. While not using knowledge on user
behaviour could constitute an important omission for any sector, it
could be a particularly significant oversight in sectors which provide
experience, credence or merit goods. In recent years, however, there has
been an increased interest in integrating user behaviour into regulatory
design and implementation. The OECD (2007, 2008 and 2009), the
European Union (DG SANCO, 2008), together with the governments of
Australia (Australian Government Productivity Commission 2007 and
2008), the United Kingdom (Fletcher, 2008; Vickers, 2003) and the
United States (Federal Trade Commission, 2007; Mulholland, 2007),
increasingly coincide that regulation which considers only the supply-
side is inadequate. These governments are now paying increased
attention to regulation from the demand-side as a complement to
supply-side considerations. Knowledge of user satisfaction is a key
means of understanding the impact of reform from the bottoms-up,
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and provides insights into the dynamics of the user-service relationship.
These insights may give rise to innovations in regulation, which in turn
will ensure that users are informed and empowered, thus enabling com-
petition, quality and innovation.
In the light of gaining a better understanding of the user while fram-
ing regulation, this paper evaluates public infrastructure services and
their reform from the user perspective. The second section of the paper
analyses how and why a common European position on evaluating infra-
structure services from the demand-side was forged during the 1990s.
Recent thinking in the Commission and its implications in terms of pol-
icy design, particularly its new emphasis on understanding consumer
behaviour is discussed. The main tools used to evaluate infrastructure
services from the demand-side are described, including an analysis of the
main improvements and limitations for the better understanding of the
effects of reform on users. The third section discusses the empirical analy-
sis. In order to gain insight into user satisfaction with infrastructure
services, the relevant data available is analysed with respect to Spanish
consumers in the European context. It should be noted that the same
methodological approach could be applied to countries around the world.
This is the future intention of the authors. Particular attention is paid to
issues of universality, accessibility, affordability, service use and non-use,
perceived importance of the services, consumer protection and so forth
from the perspective of disaggregated data on users. Because stated prefer-
ences can be difficult to compare across cultures and countries and, in
order to check these declarations, patterns of expenditure on these services
are analysed through the Household Budget Surveys (HBS). Contrasting
stated and revealed preference is an innovative methodology applied to
user satisfaction. Keeping in view the current approach to demand-side
evaluation, the conclusions in the fourth section summarise the insights
gained into the relationship between infrastructure services and users, and
conclude that some of these insights could form a basis for improved
demand-side regulation.1
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2. The Political Economy of Reforming Infrastructure 
Regulation
2.1. From State to Market: Establishing Citizen Rights 
to Public Services
Privatization, liberalization, deregulation and internationalization of
enterprises that were previously national monopolies for several decades
raise complex questions about regulation for users (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes
and Revuelta 2010). From a political economy perspective, regulatory
reform shifts the old balance between winners and losers. Theoretically,
consumers are set to gain from these reforms, due to expected price reduc-
tions and increases in service performance and choice, whilst labour may
lose as working conditions are subject to more competition.2 Usually, gov-
ernments decide the policies they wish to implement and they choose the
ones that best suit their political economy interests. An additional factor in
the case of the EU is the ‘Single Market,’ that is prevalent eversince liberal-
ization and deregulation policies were introduced, as well as the
introduction of new regulation in certain fields; and ´“lock-in” national
governments to European reform.
In the face of the dramatic reform of public services in the EU from
the 1990s, the need to establish regulation from the user perspective was
agreed, although there was a dispute on elements that were supposed to be
regulated. After some conflict, an “European compromise” was settled
between France and the UK. Whilst the French position sought to regulate
the user by establishing citizen rights or entitlements at the EU level
inscribed in a charter or Directive, UK remained optimistic about the
capacity of the market to resolve problems, though it conceded that some
small measures may be required to protect consumers. From the begin-
ning of the 21st century, the failure of the legal project to establish a
Constitution for European citizenship sounded the death knell for the
continental project. Moreover, efforts were made to find economic
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solutions, rather than legal solutions, with regard to regulating from the
user perspective. This section examines the contested development of
demand-side regulation from the 1990s and explains the position reached
at the beginning of the 21st century.
From the 1980s, as part of the Single Market Programme, the
European authorities agreed to implement liberalization and deregulation
of infrastructure services. Privatization, in contrast, was a national affair:
some countries, such as the UK, had been early privatizers, though most
Member States embarked on privatization programmes later on, from the
1990s (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes, 2003, 2006). As reform deepened
and extended, however, pressure accumulated from representatives of the
European political elite as well as from consumer and labour organizations
due to their concern with the consequences of these reforms. These con-
cerns crystallised around the fear that if the regulatory reform of
infrastructure services was left unchecked, users could experience bad
service quality than they did before the reform. Member States charac-
terised by continental legal traditions, whereby universality, accessibility
and non-discrimination were inscribed as citizens’ rights, as well as
numerous consumers’ associations, and social partners, were particularly
important representatives of this position.
Public services played an important role in the historical evolution
and institutional building of the EU Member States, representing a dif-
ferent model to that found in the United States (Galambos, 2000). One
important difference was the legal system: public services were defined
distinctly and occupied different places in the legal systems and
Constitutions of various countries. In France, Italy and Spain, citizens
enjoyed rights to public services since the 19th century. In other coun-
tries such as Germany, the Low Countries and the UK, public services
had a less marked place in the legal system, but were associated with spe-
cific obligations connected to the provision of public services (for
instance, accessibility, quality and continuity). Though there were differ-
ences across the EU, there were also many common features in terms of
the organization, ownership, regulation and development of public serv-
ice regimes. Rationales for public enterprises were similar across Europe,
such as the existence of natural monopolies, the strategic nature of goods
or services, and social justice. Other important similarities in public
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service regimes across Europe included the kinds of activities that had
been operated and managed by public enterprises, a resistance to allow-
ing market forces to govern these activities, and the introduction of
similar laws on how these services should be run (such as monopolies,
concessions, exclusive or special laws). When public services had been
provided by the State, citizens had a “voice” via a universal right to vote
nationally and locally for a political manifesto, in which public services
were always central. Politicians were accountable to citizens for public
service provision. Under privatised ownership and market-driven rules,
it was feared that commercial interests would be pursued over and above
the public interest, which could negatively affect public service obliga-
tions, universal service, quality, price and continuity of supply, blurring
who would be taken as accountable for these services (CEEP and ETUC,
2000). As firms in the communications, transportation, water and
energy sectors became increasingly internationalised, fears were voiced
by consumer associations and other NGOs that basic public services that
were once understood to “belong” to the nation would now be owned
and controlled by distant foreign interests motivated by short-term
profits because of the principal-agent problem (Balanyá et al. 2000).
Considering much internationalization was by foreign national govern-
ments, another concern was geopolitics: in Europe, the main threat was
Russia’s perceived energy interests (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes,
2007; Goldstein, 2007).
As privatization and liberalization of the infrastructure services
gained importance, actors — led particularly by France and Belgium —
began to express their fundamental concerns. Whilst liberalization was a
clearly defined policy, the nature and role of “Services of General Interest”
or SGI3 — which could be legible for state-aid and exemption from liber-
alization — was less clearly defined. In general, these actors were not
against reform per se. However, they insisted whether on or not public
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services fell in to private or public hands, the user needed written guaran-
tees about their rights, which should be included in a European Directive
or Charter. In 1994, Jacques Delors, the President of the European
Commission (EC) commissioned two of the EU social partners — the
“European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of
Enterprises of General Economic Interest” (CEEP), and the European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) — to draft a Charter for SGI as a
basis for a Framework Directive, which was published six years later after
many rounds of consultation (CEEP and ETUC, 2000, EC, 2003b, EC,
2004). This development was also championed by the European
Parliament and supported by the German government (Prosser, 2005).
The draft Charter urged for a “bottom-up” approach to social regulation.
This draft mentioned that citizens — not users or consumers — are more
important and argued that all citizens should be guaranteed rights to:
equal access, no discrimination, continuously working, quality and adapt-
able services, universal provision, safety, fair pricing, efficiency levels that
could be verified objectively, transparency, participation and democratic
control. In this way, public services would be a foundation for a ‘Social
Europe’ characterised by solidarity, territorial and social inclusion, quality
of life and a dynamic economy (Van de Walle, 2006). A logical extension
of guaranteeing rights to public services was the establishment of a
European citizenship — part of the objective behind the failed European
Constitution.
2.2. A European Compromise: Creating “Citizen–Consumers”
Other EU actors, particularly business lobbies and the British and
Dutch governments argued that granting entitlements to citizens was
unnecessary, and that liberalization should be allowed to work freely,
though, as consumers, some forms of protection may need to be estab-
lished. To counter the French-led proposals, they proposed a
market-based one, much of which was influenced by New Public
Management (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes, 2005). While the con-
tinental position called for a charter or Directive to uphold citizens’
rights, the UK and Dutch governments supported a service charter sim-
ilar to those associated with New Public Management, as promoted by
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governments in Australia, UK and the United States, as well as interna-
tional organizations such as OECD (McGuire, 2002). Though diverse in
scope and objectives, most service charters emphasize issues about con-
sumer empowerment and performance benchmarking. New Public
Management basically suggests that market mechanisms can be intro-
duced into business where privatization is not feasible or desirable.
Though the concept of New Public Management has been criticised as
being over-stretched (Hood, 2001), it is often associated with tech-
niques such as contracting out and downsizing. From the consumer
perspective, users may pay for good information about service per-
formance, levels of satisfaction, and have channels to voice their
discontent (Hirschman 1970; Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes, 2005).
There are several important differences between the “citizen-centred”
and “consumer-centred” approaches (Clarke et al., 2007), but perhaps
the most fundamental one is that the “continental” perspective
addresses citizens (the entire population) whilst the “Anglo-Saxon” per-
spective begins with the point of consumption; little is said about those
who fall outside this market exchange.
As is the case with EU, a compromise was sought to satisfy oppos-
ing positions. In Communications, such as EC (2000), the Commission
attempted to “merge” the two main positions by using “citizen” and
“consumer” almost interchangeably. It was argued that citizen and con-
sumer rights were two sides of the same coin: consumers must be
guaranteed a set of basic obligations by service providers, enjoy the
choice of supplier, receive a transparent and better service at a lower
price. It was argued that citizen and consumer rights were compatible,
and both helped to forge a ‘Stronger Europe’ in economic and social
terms. Perhaps, the Commission was trying to fudge the differences,
because debate grew with the publication of the Green Paper of SGI in
2003 (EC, 2003b). The Green Paper elicited responses that revealed
significant differences across the EU, with British and French policy-
makers representing the most “extreme” positions. This Paper was
concerned with whether user rights should take the form of a charter
or Directive, and, if so, whether a single charter or a series of mini-
charters for each kind of public service would be preferable. The
British opposed the establishment of a single charter, while the French
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emphasised the need for a proper definition of SGI as well as a clarifi-
cation that the Member States could use discretion in order to organise
and fund them as required (Prosser, 2005). The resulting White Paper,
published two years later, only contained “soft” instruments with
regard to regulation for two main reasons: First, due to the lack of con-
sensus about the way in which user rights to these services should be
regulated, second, because overshadowing all these developments was
the process whereby the European Constitutional Treaty was to come
into force, granting rights to a long-awaited European citizenship.
When the Constitutional Treaty was rejected and, as the EU entered an
institutional crisis, the project to establish of rights to these services
linked to citizenship faded away.
If, in the mid-1990s, it looked possible that a Directive could be passed
that focused squarely on establishing citizens’ rights to these services, it
seems that the EU has quietly abandoned the aim of protecting citizens
through “positive integration.” Any rights to services will be guaranteed at
the national level, or will be promoted by the European authorities
through “soft” instruments (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2010).
2.3. Evaluating Regulation: What do we Know, and How?
From the 1980s, the rhetoric of reformist policy-makers centred on the
ideas of augmenting choice and quality of infrastructure services for users.
Paradoxically, systematic research on whether users are more satisfied after
reform has not always been prioritised. Most policies have focused on
supply-side concerns, and it is only more recently that attention is being
paid to demand-side issues. Better information about users’ opinions
forms the crux this new approach.
The EC started to monitor public opinion from 1973, using standard
survey techniques as a working tool in its policy-making process. Since
then, special surveys which focused on specific topics were introduced —
including user satisfaction with public services — as well as surveys by
telephone and more qualitative approaches including the use of focus
groups. Between 1997 and 2007, surveys dedicated to exploring satisfac-
tion with public services changed in terms of the focus of the survey, the
questions posed, those surveyed and the process of inclusion/exclusion of
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those surveyed. For methodological reasons, the first survey, published in
1997, is not directly comparable to the proceeding ones. However, from
2000, the methodology is homogenous. Therefore, results can be directly
compared.
The first dedicated survey was conducted by the Eurobarometer 47.1
(EC, 1997). This is different from the proceedings ones, because it focused
on views of citizens in the face of the prospective exposure of public
monopolies to competition. To this extent, it is the only survey of opinions
about public services “before” they are subject to significant regulatory
change or at a relatively early stage in regulatory reform, though regulatory
change was already advanced in some Member States and relatively more
advanced in telecommunications than in other public service sectors.
There are two striking features of this survey (Clifton, Comín and 
Díaz-Fuentes, 2005): First, the 1997 survey is concerned with the opinions
of “citizens” as opposed to “users” — questions focus on perceptions two
citizens have about the opening of monopolies with regards to prices,
access, quality, choice and consumer protection, as well as questions about
what benefits they had already noticed. The influence of the continental
approach is thus revealed: for instance, in the 121-page document, “citi-
zen” is used 303 times. The other striking thing is the survey results: levels
of citizen satisfaction depend heavily on 1) the country a citizen resides in
and 2) the sector being evaluated.
The proceeding surveys on satisfaction are more directed at user sat-
isfaction. Thanks to the efforts by the Commission to deploy the same
methodology, the surveys from 2000 onwards are directly comparable
making the evaluation of satisfaction over time possible. Each of these sur-
veys consists of in-depth analyses of consumer satisfaction with SGI, in the
EU-15 (EC, 2000; EC, 2002), the new EU-10 (EC, 2003a) and the EU-25
(EC, 2005; EC, 2007b). EC (2000), EC (2002), EC (2003a) and EC (2005)
measure satisfaction with access, price, information and other contract
indicators for electricity, gas, water, fixed telephony, mobile telephony,
postal services, urban transport and railways. EC (2007b) covers these sec-
tors plus internet and banking.
There is one significant methodological difference, however, which
mirrors the concerns in Europe over understanding consumer behav-
iour. In the 2000 and 2002 surveys, “non-consumers” were screened out
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of the survey results. The problem with this exclusion is that the results
on satisfaction are biased as they do not include those who cannot afford
them, do not have sufficient information about them, or do not want
them for a variety of reasons. To a great extent, this policy reflected the
influence of New Public Management’s focus on the consumer. This pol-
icy was changed in the 2004 and 2006 surveys: here, the survey
respondents were grouped into two categories at the outset: consumers
and non-consumers of a given service. Both categories were analysed in
order to gain a deeper understanding of items consumed people.
Questions of access were stressed for both categories, and, once identi-
fied, non-consumers were surveyed further on issues such as
accessibility, affordability-price, quality, consumer rights’ protection and
consumer relations. Non-consumers who potentially had service provi-
sion were asked about accessibility, affordability and knowledge of the
quality and reliability of the services. In addition, for the first time, addi-
tional socio-economic variables of respondents were considered in the
analysis, including gender, age, education, household composition and
urbanisation. These efforts towards better understanding consumer
behaviour, including the behaviour of “non-consumers” differed from
the earlier attempt to study citizens’ opinions. These changes reflect a
better understanding of consumption patterns in the first few years of
the 21st century as discussed in the fourth section.
Now, while the Eurobarometer provides rich statistical data on citizens’
opinions and perceptions with regard to infrastructure services, they have
not been used sufficiently in the design and implementation of regulatory
policies until now. In addition, there has been a lack of empirical and ana-
lytical research to uncover what can be learnt about stated preferences for
evaluating an infrastructure reform. One exception is a study by Clifton,
Comín and Díaz-Fuentes (2005) that analysed patterns in stated user sat-
isfaction across the EU-25 for six services based on Eurobarometers
1997–2004. In addition, Fiorio et al. (2007), Bacciochi et al. (2008) and
Fiorio and Florio (2008) also used Eurobarometers to assess infrastructure
reforms based on stated preferences. These three studies found that com-
petition, but not privatization, has a positive effect on satisfaction,
particularly on prices. Fiorio et al. (2007) highlight the complexity of the
economic, social and institutional environment as a determinant of
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attitudes about these services. Fiorio and Florio (2008) conclude that insti-
tutional circumstances should be borne in mind while designing
regulatory policies, since it is misleading to assume that a single, homoge-
neous regulatory framework will have the same results in different
contexts.
The objective of research based on stated preferences is to empirically
analyse questions previously studied from the theoretical perspective. This
justifies the need to evaluate institutional aspects and the quality of public
policy, as well as the net effect in terms of winners and losers (Frey and
Stutzer, 2002). However, a large literature exists which points to the biases
that may arise in the expression of stated preferences. This has led to scep-
ticism in deploying data on user satisfaction as a means of improving the
design of service regulation. Stated preferences have traditionally been
compared with revealed preferences (user behaviour) as an instrument to
explain consumer behaviour. The utility inference derived from real con-
sumer behaviour has been dominant, due to its ascribed objectivity, when
comparing comparatively household welfare from the economic point of
view. Despite this, there is a lack of research on the evaluation of regula-
tory reform of infrastructure services, perhaps due to a lack of
homogenous data at the European level. Recently, more attention has been
paid to evidence of empirical anomalies in human behaviour which that
utility can be inferred from revealed preferences (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
This could imply that when regulation is evaluated from the demand-side,
possible biases in user behaviour, which are crucial to the new economic
approach detailed in the next section, should be taken into account. Thus,
stated and revealed preferences could be considered as complementary
sources, which when combined, will enrich the analysis of user behaviour.
2.4. Implications for Designing a Regulatory Framework: 
New Regulatory Policies in the OECD and EU
From the early years of the 21st century, new ideas gained importance
among policy-makers in institutions such as OECD, the EU, as well as sev-
eral national competition agencies such as those in Australia, United States
and the United Kingdom. Just as ideas derived from New Public
Management diffused by the OECD and other organizations, particularly
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Anglo-Saxon governments, became influential within European authori-
ties during the 1990s, in the first few years of the 21st Behavioural
Economics was promoted by the same countries and organizations.
Using insights from psychology, behavioural economists critiqued the
traditional view of homo oeconomicus consumers as rational, selfish and
time-consistent individuals which underwrote an understanding of the act
of consumption as a cost-benefit analysis resulting in the optimum choice
for the individual. Though economists argued that this was a useful approx-
imation of consumer behaviour, other economists and psychologists argued
that insights from psychology based on observation could help to refine this
traditional approximation. In particular, insights from Behavioural
Economics tries to explain why consumers do not always take optimum
decisions. For instance, behavioural economists analyse ways in which peo-
ple tend to discount the future whilst overemphasising the present
(“myopia”), which may led to inertia: diets always start tomorrow. In addi-
tion, Behaviour Economics argues that the way in which information is
presented — or framing — can affect consumer behaviour. Experiments
showed how pictures of a female associated with a product could signifi-
cantly increase sales. The product information is presented with default
options. Depending on whether the default option is to automatically
become — or not become — a member of a pension scheme could have sig-
nificant consequences for peoples’ future security, it was claimed. Moreover,
choice or information overload may result in consumer boredom and non-
consumption, or in electing the “wrong” product. Applied insights on
information presentation to the infrastructures, research have shown that,
frequently, when consumers switch provider, a great proportion opt for a
package that makes them worse off (EC 2007a; DG SANCO, 2008). This
could be explained by lack of information, information overload and other
aspects of human psychology. Kahneman (2002) explained the phenome-
non of “slow learning” which occurs not because people do not learn but
because of the way information is processed. Behavioural economists also
studied the ways in which social aspects such as peoples’ level of education,
gender, residence and age can affect their consumption decisions. Applying
these insights to use of infrastructure services could shed light on why citi-
zens do not always take optimal decisions. For instance, many consumers fail
to switch provider when better alternatives are available. Other behaviours
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vis-à-vis infrastructure could be explained using data on the social context
or their social role.
Patterns in user behaviour could be useful in explaining how markets
function. Of late, it is argued that these insights could have important con-
sequences for regulatory design. In this regard, from the practitioner
perspective, one powerful suggestion is that rather than separating com-
petition policy (supply-side) and consumer policy (demand-side)
institutionally, these regulations could — and should — be combined.
This is recommended by the new “Fair Trade Policy” at the UK Office of
Fair Trading (Fletcher, 2008). By merging demand and supply-side
regulation, aspects of consumer behaviour, such as inertia, limited
memory, myopia, choice overload and so on can be addressed through
better regulation.
DG SANCO argues that incorporating consumer behaviour into the
design of regulatory frameworks for infrastructure could be a means of
improving regulatory quality. A better understanding user behaviour as
part of a demand-side consideration, combined with supply-side
considerations, could be incorporated into a better, higher quality,
regulatory policies. Improved regulation of these issues can make con-
sumers and non-consumers alike more knowledgeable about products
and services, thus making them more “empowered,” “active” and
“confident” in the marketplace (Fletcher, 2008). Improving our under-
standing of consumer behaviour could mean consumers benefit more
from the potential advantages of competition policy. From a political
point of view, it should be noted that this solution is of interest to the
Commission because, while it has historic competence in competition
policy, it has lesser competence and experience in consumer policy. An
attempt to merge elements of consumer policy with competition policy
could increase the Commission’s competence in consumer policy. Because
of that, particularly active in this project was the newly-established
Directorate for Health and Consumers, also known as DG SANCO.
The previous approach to defending citizens’ rights to public services
was abandoned, whilst policy-makers turned to eclectic approaches to
economics for sources of new insights into regulation. From 2006, the
Commission undertook a review of the Single Market Programme in
order to identify what was still not working with regard to an integrated
1st Reading
14 J. Clifton et al.
b1065_Chapter-02.qxd  9/1/2010  6:49 PM  Page 14
b1065 Infrastructure Regulation
market. A list of 23 sectors — which were both important for the
European economy and which displayed significant problems with refer-
ence to obstacles to a Single Market was identified. Unsurprisingly, all the
main public — infrastructure services were included on this list. With ref-
erence to supply-side regulation, an in-depth analysis was done to
quantifying characteristics such as market power, competition, prices,
mark ups and so on, with the aim of reconsidering the optimum policy
response (DG SANCO, 2008). However, this is also being complemented
by a demand-side analysis, as the Commission, in accordance with the
OECD, states that interactions between consumers and the market may
exhibit problems that may not be addressed by the supply-side regulation.
Thus, the Commission is seriously studying the benefits of demand-side
regulation, if analysis indicates this is required.
In order to signal increased attention to understanding the consumer,
a new tool known as the “Consumer Market Scoreboard” (DG SANCO,
2008) was launched in 2008. The idea was to produce a highly visible and
accessible document that contains aspects such as consumer use and satis-
faction with products and services across the EU on an annual basis. Since
the Commission had been producing detailed surveys and reports on satis-
faction with infrastructure services since 1997, the approach and data used
in these surveys and reports dominated the work done so far. In order to
gather similar information on user satisfaction for the other sectors, the
Commission and DG SANCO have to coordinate the collection of national
data on consumer satisfaction and behaviour from national authorities.
3. Exploring Patterns of Infrastructure Use
The main objective of this section is to empirically analyse consumer
behaviour patterns vis-à-vis public infrastructure services. Data is derived
from the Eurobarometer to assess the use of services and explanations for
use and non-use. Stated preferences are contrasted with revealed prefer-
ences through an analysis of household expenditure patterns on these
services. On the contrary, preferences constitutes an innovative way of
evaluating infrastructure services from the demand-side. The main
characteristics of the database sources for stated and revealed preferences
are shown in Table 1. The stated preferences or citizen satisfaction with
1st Reading
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SGI are derived from the Eurobarometer (EC, 2006). These are compared
with revealed preferences, or consumption patterns of particular services,
derived, in this case, from the Spanish Household Budget Survey (Encuesta
de Presupuestos Familiares or SHBS) of the same year (INE, 2006). Clearly,
this analysis could be extended to the rest of the EU using the Household
Budget Survey (EUROSTAT, 2009). Both surveys include data on the use
of diverse services, including, for our purposes, electricity, gas, water, fixed
and mobile telephony and internet services. The Spanish survey sample is
19,435 households, while the Eurobarometer sample is 1,006 individuals.
Socio-economic characteristics which are comparable across the two sur-
veys are marked in bold.4 There are other characteristics included in one
survey but not in the other, such as political position (in the
Eurobarometer but not in SHBS), or total household income (in SHBS but
not in the Eurobarometer). Whilst the Eurobarometer indicates whether
individuals state they use a service, SHBS reveals consumption through
expenditure. Service use is revealed when the amount spent is positive.
A preliminary and an important observation is that the stated and
revealed use for all six services is highly consistent. Electricity and water
are universal services, fixed and mobile telephony are near-universal,
whereas gas and internet are less-universal services. Revealed use is higher
than the stated use for universal or near-universal services, whilst the
stated use is higher than the revealed use for two less-universal ones.
Therefore, the stated use and the revealed use can be calculated according
to the most relevant control variables in the survey, thus identifying the
most important factors explaining the non-use of services. These factors
are listed by declining importance under each sector. There is also a high
degree of consistency with regard to factors explaining non-use. Age
appears repeatedly as a significant factor. Lower educational attainment
appears to be relevant for usage of gas, mobile telephony and internet
while rural areas are relevant for usage of gas, fixed phone and the inter-
net people above 65 are less likely to use mobile telephony, internet and
gas; whilst younger people are less likely to use electricity, water and fixed
telephony. Rural dwellers are less likely to use gas and internet, whilst
1st Reading
18 J. Clifton et al.
4 Climate considerations have also been introduced to better understand consumption
patterns of electricity and gas.
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people with lower educational attainment are less likely to use mobile
telephony and internet.
Using information on the stated use of services, Table 2 analyses the
factors that best explain the use of the six sectors. Both personal charac-
teristics of the person surveyed, as well as their satisfaction with different
aspects of service provision, are tested for their influence on service use. In
order to do so, probit estimations and marginal effects of the following
models are used:
Yi = α + βXi + εi (1)
Yi = α + γZi + εi (2)
Yi = α + βXi + γZi + εi (3)
where:
Yi = Service use: 1 = Use, 0 = Non-use.
Xi = Personal control variables such as age, sex, educational attainment
and so on, as listed in Table 2.
Zi = Control variables about the services with reference to satisfaction with
accessibility, satisfaction with affordability, perception of the services as
being important, perception of the service as being very important, ease
with which offers can be compared and satisfaction with consumer
protection.
There are some striking findings with regard to factors influencing
service use. First, consistently, for all six sectors, satisfaction with accessibil-
ity is — by some margin — the leading common factor associated with the
service use. That is, the easier users perceive access to a given service, the
more chances of them using that service. The second observation only con-
cerns the three communications services since questions about ‘how
important the service in question is’ perceived for daily life was only asked
of these, and was not a common question across all sectors. In all the three
cases, the more important these sectors are perceived to be for daily life, the
higher the probability of these being used. The association between impor-
tance assigned to a service and use was stronger than the association
between accessibility satisfaction and use. Returning to common factors
asked of all six services, the second common factor explaining use was sat-
isfaction with price (affordability), though this was much less significant
than accessibility satisfaction. More in-depth analysis is organised by sector.
1st Reading
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Reinforcing the universality of electricity and water as shown in
Table 1, personal characteristics intervene only weakly in explaining
usage as provision is non-discriminatory. Accessibility to electricity and
water is by far the most explanation for usage (48.98% and 47.44%
respectively). Affordability comes second, though it is much less impor-
tant in explaining the usage (3.39 and 5.67% respectively). Gas services
are available to around 60% of households. With respect to usage of elec-
tricity and water, the most satisfactory explanation for usage is
accessibility (63.91%) followed by affordability (34.7%). Associations
with affordability are stronger than those found in the other five sectors.
Personal characteristics of the respondents also matter: one-parent fam-
ilies or the ones with people above 65 are more likely to use gas (34.1%
and 13.08% respectively), whilst negative associations are found for for-
eigners (−30.7%), rural dwellers (−13.8%) and two-parent families with
children (−8.86%).
Fixed telephony services cover over 80% of consumers, mobile
phones cover around 70% and the internet around 30%. In all three cases,
perceptions that these services are either important or very important for
daily life were strongly associated with probability of usage. For fixed
phones, perceptions of their being important or very important and
usage reached 30.46% and 10.43% respectively; in the case of mobile
telephony this was 38.59% and for the internet this was 28.48% and
20.72% respectively. For electricity, water and gas, there were strong pos-
itive links between satisfaction with accessibility and usage, though this
was weaker for communications services (21.52% for fixed phones 30.8%
for mobile telephony and 27.69% for internet). Satisfaction with afford-
ability is more strongly associated with usage than with electricity and
water, though not more than gas (11.06% for fixed phones, 12.89% for
mobile telephony and 16.48% for internet). In contrast to water and
energy, issues of satisfaction with provision and customer handling
appear to play a significant role in explaining usage patterns. Satisfaction
with consumer protection in the mobile sector is positively associated
with use of mobile telephony (5.56%). Personal characteristics influence
usage the self-employed are more likely to use mobile telephony
(13.41%), fixed phones (11.37%) and internet (15.61%) communications.
Students (16.49%), the self-employed (15.91%), the unemployed
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(14.93%) are also more likely to use internet. Personal characteristics also
affect usage in a negative way: for fixed phones, these include rural
dwellers (−11.59%) and females (−3.86%); for mobile phones, these are
people above 65 (−21.71%) and those with lower educational attainment
(−12.02), and for the internet, rural dwellers (−18.45%), the over 65s
(−13.9%), singletons (−13.01%), females (−10%) and those with lower
educational attainment (−9%).
The revealed use is derived from the SHBS (INE, 2006) as shown in
Table 3. Average spending on the service in question of the population is
measured (Gij). In addition, the variation coefficient of Gi is calculated, in
order to analyse the extent to which this is homogenous. Next, the average
service expenditure by household users is calculated (Gij | Gi > 0). The relative
importance of Gij / Gi is calculated in relation to total household expenditure,
to discount the income effect. The absolute and relative importance is finally
analysed by a comparison of means, according to the control variables in the
SHBS. The estimation of the factors explaining service expenditure: an
Ordinary Least Squares regression is performed where the dependent vari-
able is household expenditure on a particular service (Gij) and the
independent variables are regional (Ri), territorial (Ti), household type (Hi),
characteristics of the bread-winner (Si) or economic situation (Ei),
From the applied model:
Gij = α + βRi + γTi + δHi + ζSi + ηE i + εi
where i = representative person and j = the service in question.
It is derived:
β, indicates regional differences in expenditure
γ, indicates differences related to territorial accessibility
δ, indicates differences according to household characteristics
ζ, indicates the effects due to characteristics of the bread-winner. These
include: age, non-monetary effects of employment, non-monetary effects
of education, etc.
η, indicates the effect of income, associated with levels of spending (Gi)
and/or total income.
Electricity represents an important part of household expenditure.
Because spending is largely homogenous, there are large differences in the
1st Reading
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Table 3a: Estimations of effects on revealed spending
Electricity Gas Water
Importance 377.47 326.59 135.87
(average spending)
Spending CV 0.47 0.96 1.41
Average spending (users) 383.34 326.59 135.87
Regression results β stand. β stand. β stand.
Income
TOTAL SPENDING 0.464*** 0.212*** 0.375***
TOTAL INCOME −0.017**
Sex 0.015**
WOMEN RP
Age
AGE RP 0.028*** −0.026*** 0.067***
RP < 25 −0.011***
RP < 30 −0.033***
Marital status 0.015**
SINGLE
Nationality
FOREIGN-RP 0.055*** 0.025*** 0.151***
EU-RP 0.027*** 0.020*** −0.015**
Education
Employment
UNEMP-RP 0.013**
SELFEMP-RP 0.033***
Household type
SIZE 0.052*** 0.014** 0.039***
5MEMBERS −0.026*** −0.013*
ONEPARENT −0.017*** −0.012**
WOMAN > 65 0.029***
TWO > 65 0.018** −0.017***
Territorial 0.043***
variables 0.032*** −0.028***
SEMIPOB
SCPOB 0.024***
URBANLUX −0.030*** 0.028***
URBANHIGH −0.013*
(Continued)
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Table 3a: (Continued)
Electricity Gas Water
RURAL −0.016***
MUN50000 −0.035***
MUN20000 −0.029***
MUN10000
MUN > 10000 −0.061***
Regional
variables
NOREAST −0.040***
CATALONIA 0.133*** 0.171*** 0.261***
CVALENC 0.131*** 0.092***
MADRID 0.168*** 0.247*** 0.225***
ANDALUCIA 0.177*** 0.152***
CANARIAS 0.113***
BALEARIC ISLANDS 0.045***
EXTREMADURA 0.032***
CLAMANCHA 0.023***
MURCIA 0.062***
TEMPJAN −0.076***
Source: Authors information based on INE (2006).
RP = Reference person.
Signification: * >90 %, ** >95 %, *** >99 %.
relative ease of purchasing electricity due to income differences. Despite
this, stated affordability was not very strongly linked with usage (as shown
in Table 2) because demand is inelastic. Higher expenditure is associated
with dwellers of less densely populated zones, foreigners, the unemployed
and self-employed, and the older a person the more the expenses on elec-
tricity. One-parent families spend less on electricity. It also appears that
expenses on electricity is higher in large cities that experience hot temper-
atures during the summer.
Expenditure on water is much lower than on electricity and is there-
fore quite affordable as demand is price inelastic. Variations in
expenditure, however, are high due to differences in price and consump-
tion patterns. Human geography is important as rural dwellers consume
less than those in urban zones. Communities in the south and east spend
more. Similar to expenses on electricity, increase in age and being a foreigner
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Table 3b: Estimations of effects on revealed spending
Fixed Mobile Total
telephony telephony telephony Internet
Importance (average spending) 240.23 350.62 590.85 77.85
Spending CV 1.17 1.96 2.52
Average spending (users) 290.12 519.13 620.69 250.89
Regression results β stand. β stand. β stand. β stand.
Income
TOTALSPENDING 0.321*** 0.427*** 0.480*** 0.291***
TOTALINCOME 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.018**
Sex
WOMENRP 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.026***
Age
AGE-RP 0.131*** −0.078*** −0.024**
RP < 25 −0.017**
RP < 30 −0.041***
RP < 35 0.041*** 0.039***
Marital status
SINGLE 0.020*** 0.017***
Nationality
FOREIGN-RP −0.027*** 0.102*** 0.081*** −0.018**
EU-RP 0.081*** −0.042*** −0.011* 0.039***
Education
SECONDARY 0.018***
PREUNIV 0.022*** −0.012** 0.054***
PROFEDUC −0.023*** −0.013** 0.037***
UNIV1 0.019*** −0.024*** −0.012* 0.053***
UNIV2&3 0.030*** −0.049*** −0.028*** 0.081***
Employment
LESS2OCC −0.027*** −0.020*** −0.026***
NONOCC −0.030***
SELFEMPRP 0.029*** 0.016***
Household type
SIZE 0.042*** 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.070***
ONEMEMBER 0.048*** 0.028*** 0.025**
5MEMBERS −0.023*** −0.037***
ONEPARENT −0.015**
WOMAN> 65 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.018**
TWO> 65 −0.025***
(Continued)
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Table 3b: (Continued)
Fixed Mobile Total
telephony telephony telephony Internet
Territorial
variables
SEMIPOB −0.039***
SCPOB −0.037*** 0.020*** −0.058***
RURAL −0.014**
Regional
variables
CATALONIA 0.186*** 0.026*** 0.090*** 0.099***
CVALENC 0.067*** 0.031***
MADRID 0.207*** 0.035*** 0.105*** 0.062***
ANDALUCIA 0.132*** 0.044*** 0.088***
CANARIAS 0.031*** 0.031***
Source: Authors information based on INE (2006).
RP = Reference person
Signification: * >90 %, ** >95 %, *** >99 %
are associated with greater expenditure, whilst one-parent families are
associated with less expenses on water. Water services may be granted for
free in some rural areas with abundant water resources, particularly in
northern Spain. Smaller municipalities are associated with lower levels of
expenditure on water.
Gas is a considerable expense for those households which use it.
Expenditure is negative for households in rural and less populated areas,
and older people. While expenditure on electricity increases during the
summers, expenditure increases during the winters (TEMPJAN).
Households in Madrid and Catalonia spend more perhaps because net-
works are established in these large urban areas (as will also be seen for the
internet).
Fixed phones represent an intermediate expenditure between electric-
ity and water, and variation is important. In contrast, expenditure on
mobile telephony is very high: mobile phone-user households spend more
on mobile telephony than any other similar services, though there is a
large variation. In order to study consumer behaviour in depth, expendi-
ture on fixed and mobile telephony are analysed both individually and  in
tandem with each other. There are some interesting non-monetary effects
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of education, as expenditure on voice telephony is inversely related to
education: the higher the level of education received, the less the expenses.
Moreover, the highly educated spend relatively more on fixed phones and
relatively less on mobile phones. Likewise, the older the person, the more
likely he/she will spend more on fixed phones and less on mobile phones.
In contrast, younger users spend more on mobile telephony, often, as a
substitute for fixed phones. Rural households also substitute fixed phones
for mobile telephony. Foreigners also spend more on mobile telephony
rather than on fixed phones, though EU foreigners are an exception to
this. Singletons spend relatively more on mobile telephony. One-parent
households also spend relatively less on fixed phones. Self-employed spend
more on fixed phones. The social history of telecommunications shows
that women tend to spend more on this service compared to men.
Users’ expenditure on internet services is intermediate when com-
pared to the other services and the variations are much higher than other
sectors. There is a clear, positive, relationship between level of education
attainment and internet use. Households with more educated members
spend relatively less on voice telephony but more on the internet. Rural
dwellers spend relatively less as do households with less than two jobs.
Increased age is associated negatively with expenditure on the internet.
Non-EU foreigners spend less on internet and EU nationals spend more
(a pattern reinforced by their expenditure patterns on fixed phones).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Measuring Regulatory Outcomes and Effectiveness:
What do we know? 
Mainstream approaches to the regulation of public infrastructure services
which gained importance from the 1980s, such as New Public
Management, promoted a consumer-centred policy design and evalua-
tion. And yet, for all the discussions of consumers, consumer and citizen
satisfaction with these services was only marginalised while designing reg-
ulatory policies. Little was, therefore, known about the effectiveness of
these reforms from the citizen/consumer perspective. In the light of
increased attention to supply-side considerations, as evidenced, for
instance, in the importance assigned to insights from Behavioural
1st Reading
Infrastructure Regulation 27
b1065_Chapter-02.qxd  9/1/2010  6:49 PM  Page 27
b1065 Infrastructure Regulation1st Reading
28 J. Clifton et al.
Economics in policy-making, there is increased interest among interna-
tional organizations such as the EU, the OECD and national governments
in combining supply-side with demand-side regulation.
This chapter sought to examine the demand-side for a better regula-
tion. Contrasting stated and declared preferences shows that both sources
can be complementary, and their combination can provide a better under-
standing of user behaviour. When analyzed individually, stated and
revealed preference-based analysis has limitations. A combined analysis of
stated and revealed preferences adopts an innovative approach which
helps to partially overcome these limitations. At the same time, informa-
tion problems which occur in the policy-making process can be partially
improved adopting this approach. It is often these informational problems
which affect the efficient functioning of the market with respect to infra-
structure services. It is important to have a better understanding of
consumer behaviour so as to improve regulation during the design and
implementation stages. It should also promote increasing consumer con-
fidence to take advantage of the potential benefits that arise due to
competition and liberalization. The empirical work here focused on Spain
in the context of the reform of EU-wide regulatory policies. This analysis
is part of a wider research project and focused on the evaluation of regu-
latory reform in different countries and regions.
Implications for Regulatory Design: Effectiveness and Operation
Results obtained underline the importance of evaluating regulatory
reform of infrastructure services from the demand-side with a better
understanding of consumer satisfaction and behaviour. Analysis based on
stated preferences (Eurobarometers) shows that the most used services are
electricity and water, followed by fixed phone and mobile telephony. Gas
and internet are lesser used services. In addition, variables related to serv-
ice perception are the main factors explaining service use. The main factor
is accessibility and, in the case of telecommunication services, it is per-
ceived importance. Another relevant factor for all services is affordability,
although this has a lower incidence. Factors related to personal character-
istics have a limited incidence on use: while some factors are relevant
explaining use of some of the services, none are significant in all cases.
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Contrasting stated and revealed preferences reveals that both gas and
internet are services that exhibit territorial accessibility problems. This
problem does not exist in the case of water, since its lower cost is the
explanatory factor for the lower spending in rural areas. Territorial acces-
sibility is not a key aspect either in telephony services, as mobile phones
increasingly substitute for fixed phone use and expenditure.
Revealed preference-based analysis shows relevant effects of individual
related characteristics on expenditure on the universal services such as
electricity and water. In general, a positive relation is observed between
being a foreigner and expenditure on electricity and water, on the one
hand, and between age and expenditure on water, on the other. In contrast,
one-parent families are associated with lower expenditure on electricity
and water. In telecommunications, where the possibility of choice is
greater, fixed phone expenditure is directly related to age. This holds even
when mobile telephony expenditure is included as an explanatory vari-
able. Additional expenditure ranging between 2.4 and 2.6 Euros for each
additional year is estimated. This age-related effect is greater in telecom-
munications than in the other services. Moreover, the Eurobarometer data
shows that the older a person is, the more likely he/she will exhibit a pas-
sive attitude towards telecommunications and experiences difficulty when
comparing different offers between telecommunications firms. In addi-
tion, when fixed and mobile phones are considered in tandem with each
other, an inverse relation is observed between expenditure and educational
attainment. Annual savings in telecommunications are estimated at 33
Euros for people that have received Further Education. This increases to 36
Euros for graduates and to 77 Euros for those studying advanced graduate
studies. Educational attainment is not a relevant variable when explaining
expenditure on services where there is less choice (electricity, water and
gas). Moreover, the Eurobarometer data shows that individuals with lower
educational attainments claim they have greater difficulties when compar-
ing different options available among telecommunications firms. They
also state that in the case of mobile telephony, a more passive attitude
towards the service, lower satisfaction with contract conditions and lower
perception of consumer interest protection.
The importance of analysing and understanding consumer behaviour
and its relation to individual and environmental variables is reinforced
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with other effects estimated. First, inertia is important, through personal-
related variables, explaining the use of substitutive services as fixed and
mobile phones. Secondly, a family support effect is observed — there is
less expenditure in households with a younger reference person — in the
context of a Latino-Mediterranean Welfare State (Guillén and Álvarez
2004). Last but not least, the incidence of personal attributes such as
employment or marital status on individual preferences is observed,
reflected in expenditure on some services. The results obtained show a
relationship between expenditure and certain personal-related variables.
Many of these patterns are consistent with those derived from stated pref-
erences. These results show how psychological and socio-economic
elements affect consumer behaviour vis-à-vis infrastructure services. This
reinforces the argument that better understanding the consumer from this
perspective can improve regulatory quality.
Lessons for Regulators: What Works, What doesn’t?
Analysis of the development of infrastructure regulation over time, and
the presentation of results after examining revealed and stated preferences
support the argument that regulators would do well to design and imple-
ment policies jointly based on competition policies (the supply-side
perspective) in addition to consumer policies (the demand-side perspec-
tive). Improved regulation, as a result of better understanding consumers,
may help consumers in benefitting more from the potential advantages of
liberalization and competition of services. Ideally, better regulation should
diminish cases where citizens do not take the optimal decision when con-
suming these services, such as inertia to switch.
This paper has confirmed that homogeneous consumers do not exist.
So, clearly, regulatory policies could have heterogeneous effects depending
on the characteristics of the consumer in question. Estimated effects and
recommendations derived from them should not be applied in the same
way across all the services analysed here, though several common patterns
are observed. Instead, regulators would do well to consider which of the
findings from an analysis of the demand-side would best translate into an
improvement in the quality of regulation. Interestingly, certain private
firms have been aware of the fact that consumers are not homogenous,
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and are affected by the social context surrounding them. Some fixed phone
providers has begun to offer special discounts to particular groups such as
the unemployed or foreigners. Spanish Telefónica has a tariff called “We
Help You,” while Vodafone in Italy has a reduced tariff for foreigners.
Clearly, these tariffs are not altruistic. Rather, they implement price dis-
crimination in order to avoid losing customers, particularly in the
prevailing times of crisis. In contrast, policy-makers are slow to implement
new regulatory policies based on concepts such as consumer heterogene-
ity and behavioural dimensions. Indeed, the current crisis only emphasises
the importance of consumer’s social and economic situation, which when
understood dynamically, can affect consumption patterns. Regulators
should move more quickly, with different objectives to firms, to address
issues of service consumption from the demand-side in order to improve
regulatory quality and service consumption.
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